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When Rose Cipollone learned that she had lung cancer in 1981, she continued
to smoke despite her doctor's warnings. In June of 1982, Rose's cancer progressed
and she required radical surgery; one of her lungs was removed.2 Unfortunately, the
loss of her lung was not enough to convince Rose to quit smoking. She continued
smoking, this time secretly Throughout Rose's ordeal, the tobacco companies
publicly maintained that nicotine, the main intoxicant in cigarettes, was not
addictive.5
One year later, Rose's cancer was diagnosed as terminal.6 Her fatal prognosis
prompted Rose and her husband, Antonio Cipollone, to file a suit based on violation
of express warranty and fraud in federal district court against the tobacco company
which manufactured the brand of cigarettes that Rose smoked.1 Years later,
Antonio's case reached the United States Supreme Court Even though Rose and
Antonio had both passed away, their son continued the suit which resulted in a land-
mark victory allowing smokers harmed by their prolonged use of cigarettes to
recover for claims based on fraud and misrepresentation.
9
I. INTRODUCTION
According to the American Medical Association, smoking kills more Ameri-
cans each year than alcohol, cocaine, crack, heroin, homicide, suicide, car accidents,
fires, and AIDS combined." Some illnesses which are purportedly caused by
smoking include lung, larynx, mouth, esophagus, and bladder cancer; chronic ob-
1. See Lawrence A. Schemmel, Note, Cigarette Litigation and Products Liability: Did Someone Win the
WarorHave the Battle Lines Just Been Drawn?, 14 Miss. C. L. REV. 657, 659 (1994) (detailing the factual history




5. See 141 Cong. Rec. H7470-02, H7471 (1995) (detailing the testimony of Philip Morris CEO, William
Campbell, before House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment that "cigarette smoking is not addictive,"
and that nicotine is maintained in cigarettes primarily for flavor).
6. Schemmel, supra note 1, at 659.
7. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 552 (3d Cir. 1990) (indicating that Rose and her
husband sued three tobacco companies, Liggett, Philip Morris, and Lorilard, since they allegedly manufactured the
brands which Rose had smoked), ajf'd in part, rev'd in part, 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
8. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 512 (1992) (granting the petition for certiorari to
consider whether the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempts state common law claims).
9. See infra notes 53-71 and accompanying text (summarizing the impact of the Cipollone decision on
tobacco litigation in the United States). But see Schemmel, supra note 1, at 682 (recognizing that the Supreme Court
struck a balance in Cipollone by allowing certain claims and disallowing others); see Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530-31
(holding that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempts failure to warn claims which rely on
omissions or inclusions in the tobacco company's advertising or promotion but does not preempt claims based on
express warranty, intentional fraud and misrepresentation, or conspiracy).
10. Ahron Leichtman, The Top Ten Ways to Attack the Tobacco Industry and Win the WarA gainst Smoking,
13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 729,729 (1994).
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structive pulmonary disease; coronary heart disease; and stroke.1 Despite the
overwhelming evidence of health hazards caused by smoking, people continue to
smoke, and the tobacco industry continues to reap huge profits. 12
During the 1950's, the tobacco industry did not acknowledge that cigarettes
may have been harmful to a smoker's health. In fact, they positively claimed that
cigarette smoking had no adverse effect on those who smoked.13 While there is
evidence that the tobacco industry knew of the harmful effects of smoking as early
as 1900 and did not disclose this fact to the general public, 14 the real debate revolves
around whether nicotine, the main intoxicant in cigarettes, is addictive.15 Even
though the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has classified nicotine as an ad-
dictive drug,16 the major tobacco companies still maintain that nicotine is not
addictive. 7 The tobacco companies maintain this stance despite evidence that they
knew of the addictive qualities of nicotine as early as 1969.18 As a result of the
government's classification of nicotine as addictive and the tobacco industry's sys-
tematic denial that nicotine is addictive, the general public has become more
skeptical as to the motives and activities of the tobacco industry 9
11. See Elizabeth A. Frohlich, Note, Statutes Aiding States' Recovery of Medicaid Costs from Tobacco
Companies: A Better Strategy for Redressing an Identifiable Harm?, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 445,446 (1995) (listing
the illnesses most commonly associated with smoking and adding that cigarette smoking may also be responsible
for infertility and peptic ulcer disease).
12. See Leichtman, supra note 10, at 729 (characterizing cigarettes as "one of the most profitable consumer
products ever sold, despite damaging health research, smoking restrictions and decreasing consumption by North
Americans").
13. See Schemmel, supra note 1, at 657 (detailing an advertisement with spokesperson Arthur Godfrey
which stated that a medical specialist examined smokers and "report[ed] he ha[d] observed no adverse effects
whatever on the noses, the throat, the sinuses, the ears, or other organs from smoking Chesterfields").
14. See Jeff I. Richards, Clearing the Air About Cigarettes: Will Advertiser's Rights Go Up in Smoke?, 19
PAC. U. 1, 5 (1987) (claiming that by the early 1900s, research turned up evidence showing that there might be
a correlation between smoking and illness).
15. See Nicotine Attack: Cigarette Regulation Is Formally Proposed; Industry Sues to Halt It, WALL ST.
J.,Aug. 11, 1995, atAl [hereinafter Nicotine Attack] (reporting that theFood andDrug Administration has declared
cigarettes a drug and the tobacco industry has repeatedly stated that it doesn't regard cigarettes as addictive).
16. See Frohlich, supra note 11, at 446-47 n.l1 (chronicling the FDA's classification of nicotine as
addictive).
17. Nicotine Attack, supra note 15, at Al.
18. See 141 Cong. Rec. H7470-02, H7471 (1995) (describing the congressional testimony of Rep. Henry
Waxman (D-Calif.) who claimed that "as early as 1969, the board of directors of Philip Morris was briefed by its
researchers on the addictive nature of nicotine"); see also John Schwartz, Documents Point to Manipulation of
Nicotine in Low-Tar Cigarettes, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1995, at A12 (publishing a May 1974 memo from tobacco
company scientists which stated that they manipulated tar and nicotine parameters of cigarettes in order to produce
"optimal cigarette acceptability"); Firm Adds Nicotine to Cigarettes, Brief Says; Smoking: Sealed Documents
Contradict Philip Morris Testimony Before Congress. But the Tobacco Company Calls the Accusations
'Preposterous.,' L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1996, at 14 (purporting to quote Philip Morris employee manuals and other
documents saying the company "extracts nicotine from tobacco that it throws away and then adds this new nicotine
to other tobacco batches").
19. Milo Geyelin, Smokers' Suit Tries New Approach: The Industry Made Them Do It, WALL ST. J., Mar.
21, 1995, at BI; see Bob Hohler, Alleging Tobacco Conspiracy, Meehan to Urge US Grand Jury Inquiry, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 14, 1994, at 3 (stating that Rep. Martin Meehan of Massachusetts will "urge the Justice Department
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Responding to the public outcry against the tobacco industry, the California
Legislature has enacted two bills which speak to various plaintiffs' concerns over
the immunities which have been enjoyed by tobacco companies under California
Civil Code section 1714.45.20 Chapter 25 affirms the right of public entity plaintiffs
to sue for medical expense reimbursement for illnesses caused by smoking,"
enabling Attorney General Dan Lungren to join the other states which have already
filed suit against the tobacco companies for medical expense reimbursement.
22
Chapter 570 removes common law barriers against individual plaintiffs' lawsuits
by removing tobacco from the illustrative list of "common consumer products" 23
and by positively stating that "this section does not exempt tobacco products from
liability actions."24
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Even though smokers have been suing tobacco companies since the 1950's,
2 5
until recently no plaintiff has been awarded monetary damages.26 Generally, three
reasons explain why plaintiffs' lawsuits have failed so miserably. First, there is a
public perception that smoking is a choice and that the smoker should be respon-
sible for the risks associated with that choice.27 Second, the tobacco industry has
maintained a hard-line litigation strategy by fighting every lawsuit, no matter how
expensive, and never settling out of court.28 Third, many states have incorporated
to lead a federal grand jury investigation into a possible 40-year criminal conspiracy by the tobacco industry to
deceive t e US government and public").
20. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1714.45(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997) (codifying the common law rule that t
manufacturer shall not be liable if the product is inherently unsafe and is a common con mmer product such as
tobacco).
21. Id. § 1714.45(d) (added by Chapter 25).
22. See ASSEMBLY FLOOR, ANALYSiS OFAB 1603, at 2 (Apr. 24, 1997) (detailing Lungren's interpretation
of California Civil Code § 1714.45 which he believed prevented him from suing).
23. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.45(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 570).
24. Id. § 1714.45(b) (added by Chapter 570).
25. See Robert L. Rabin, A Soclolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853, 857
(1992) (noting that in the early 1950s, consumers launched the first wave of cigarette litigation against tobacco
manufacturers).
26. See Schemmel, supra note 1, at 666 (indicating that as of 1994, the tobacco industry held a perfect
record against all legal challenges); see also Suein L. Hwang, Fonner Smoker is Awarded $2 Million in Suit Over
Illness Blamed on Filter, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 1995, at B6 (discussing a 1995 case which resulted in a $2 million
judgment against the manufacturer of Kent Cigarettes). But see City and County of San Francisco v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 957 E Supp. 1130, 1140 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that a state common law claim brought by a public entity
for medical expense reimbursement is not barred by California Civil Code § 1714.45).
27. See Schemmel, supra note 1, at 666 (surmising that plaintiffs have failed against the tobacco companies
due in part to juries' hostility toward plaintiffs who blamed others for the consequences of their own decision to
smoke).
28. See Mark Curriden, Litigants Talk Tobacco, A.B.A. J., June 1997, at 20 (disclosing the contents of a
memo marked "internal and confidential" and signed by the lead lawyer for a major cigarette company which details
the industry's litigation strategy to "fight all lawsuits").
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various immunities into their product liability statutes in an effort to protect the
economy while still looking out for the consumers' best interests. 29
A. The Basis for Product Liability: section 402A of the Restatement Second of
Torts and Comment i
Due to technological advances over the past hundred years, by the early 1960s
it had become clear that negligence and breach of warranty theories were no longer
feasible as means of recovery for defective products.3" Negligence theories were too
difficult for plaintiffs to prove in a products liability action since they needed to
show some kind of negligent conduct on the part of the manufacturer which may
have occurred years before the plaintiff's injury.3' Similarly the privity requirement
in contract law made warranty theory limited in scope because defective products
were sold through chains of distribution that did not necessarily involve the manu-
facturer.32 Consequently, strict products liability evolved as the preferred way to
hold sellers and manufacturers responsible for product-related injuries, including
those injuries caused by cigarettes.33
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts reinforced common law
decisions which had been finding in favor of plaintiffs by using a strict product
liability theory.34 However, when plaintiffs with tobacco-related illness began suing
tobacco companies, they were blocked by the tobacco industry defense that com-
ment i prevented recovery.35 Comment i was included in section 402A to exempt
tobacco and other products that "cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all
consumption" from applications of section 402A unless there is some
29. See, e.g., Richards v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th 985,998-99,928 P.2d 1181, 1183,60 Cal. Rptr.
2d 103, 111 (1997) (analyzing the abbreviated legislative history of California Civil Code § 1714.45 and finding
that the immunity granted to tobacco companies was "intended only to prevent withdrawal of the enumerated
products from the market, against the wishes of society").
30. See Peter F. Riley, Note, The Product Liability of the Tobacco Industry: Has Cipollone v. Liggett Group
Finally Pierced the Cigarette Manufacturer's Aura of Invincibility?; 30 B.C. L. REV. 1103, 1106 (1989) (stating
that the concept of product liability emerged to hold manufacturers and sellers financially accountable for the safety
of their products).
31. See id. at 1110 (indicating that negligence theories were replaced in lieu of strict liability theories
because negligence was difficult to prove in many cases).
32. Schemmel, supra note 1, at 664.
33. Id.
34. This section reads: Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer (1) One
who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a)
the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or
consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule... applies although (a) the
seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not
bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTOTS
§ 402A (1965).
35. See Rabin, supra note 25, at 864 (postulating that "comment i sounded the death knell for the first wave
of tobacco litigation").
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manufacturing defect in the product itself which makes it more harmful than the
average consumer expects it to be.36 In interpreting comment i, the California
Supreme Court held that "a manufacturer or seller breaches no legal duty to
voluntary consumers by merely supplying, in an unadulterated form, a common
commodity which cannot be made safer, but which the public desires to buy and
ingest despite general understanding of its inherent dangers." 37 Since section
1714.45 of the California Civil Code expressly states that it is derived from
comment i of section 402A,38 a tobacco supplier, according to California law,
simply commits no tort against knowing and voluntary smokers by making
cigarettes available for their use.
39
B. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
As public concern grew over the health hazards posed by cigarette smoking, the
United States' Congress responded by enacting the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act of 1965.' The Act established the familiar "Surgeon General
Warnings" which appear on every carton of cigarettes and in every piece of ad-
vertising.4' The Legislature stated the statute's purpose as two-fold: (1) To ade-
quately inform the public that cigarette smoking may be hazardous to health, and
(2) to protect the national economy from the burden imposed by diverse, non-
uniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations. 2
Just four years after it had been enacted, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act was amended by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969,
to include more stringent Surgeon General warnings and controversial preemption
language which provided fuel for nearly 25 years of debate.43 The controversial
provision states that "[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health
shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any
36. American Tobacco Co. v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 3d 480, 488, 255 Cal. Rptr. 280,284 (1989);
Frohlich, supra note 11, at 450.
37. Richards v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th 985, 1000,928 P.2d 1181, 1190,60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 103, 112
(1997).
38. CAL CIV. CODE§ 1714.45(a)(2) (West Supp. 1997); see Richards, 14 Cal. 4th at 999,928 P.2d at 1190,
60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 112.
39. Richards, 14 Cal. 4th at 1000, 928 P.2d at 1191, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 113.
40. Francisco Hernandez, Jr. & Jordan M. Parker, Federal Preemption of State Tort Actions Under the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 27 TORT & INs. L.J. 1, 1 (1991) (explaining that the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act was enacted to quell public concerns over tobacco).
41. See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act § 4. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1333 (West 1982) (establishing
labeling requirements for cigarette packaging and advertising).
42. Id. at § 1331 (as articulated in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,514 (1992)),
43. See Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 § 2, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1333 (West 1982) (making
warnings more forceful than they had been under the previous Act); id. at § 2, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1334 (West 1982)
(setting forth the controversial "State law" preemption language); see also Hernandez, Jr. & Parker, supra note 40,
at 4 (indicating that the preemption language was unclear as to what extent Congress intended to prcempt state tort
claims).
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cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of
this chapter."M While the Act's express language clearly prevents the states from
imposing additional or inconsistent labeling requirements on cigarette manufac-
turers, by broadening the preemption to include "State law," Congress had left
unclear whether all state tort claims against cigarette manufacturers were preempted
as well.45
Although warning labels were originally designed to hold the cigarette
manufacturers accountable by forcing them to warn the public of the dangers posed
by cigarette smoking, they instead were used by the tobacco industry to insulate
themselves from lawsuits filed by cancer victims and their families. 6 By using the
preemption language set forth in section 2 of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking
Act of 1969,4' the tobacco companies successfully argued that their compliance
with the warning requirements shielded them from liability under state law claims.4
Ultimately, however, the cigarette manufacturer's preemption argument failed when
the United States Supreme Court settled the debate in Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
InC.
49
C. Federal Preemption and the Cipollone Decision
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution states, in pertinent
part, that "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby."5 This clause is the basis for the
Preemption Doctrine which asserts the rule that federal law controls over any state,
municipal, or local law or regulation that occupies the field or conflicts with federal
law.5 When a court interprets legislation to discern whether state law is preempted
by federal law, the judge must determine "whether the scheme of federal regulation
is so comprehensive that it is reasonable to infer that Congress left no room for state
regulation."'52
44. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1334(b) (West 1982).
45. Hernandez, Jr. & Parker, supra note 40, at 3-4.
46. See Leichtman, supra note 10, at 732 (describing how the warning labels were intended to be a sword
against cigarette manufacturers but have instead become a shield against lawsuits).
47. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 § 2, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1334 (West 1982).
48. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,508 (1992) (citing the lower court of appeals holding
that petitioner's state law claims were preempted by the federal statute and recognizing that other courts have agreed
with that analysis).
49. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 519-20 (holding that state laws pertaining to cautionary warnings are
preempted while general state law damages actions are not).
50. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
51. Hernandez, Jr. & Parker, supra note 40, at 1-2.
52. Id. at 2.
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Federal preemption was the main issue in Rose Cipollone's case53 by the time
it found its way to the United States Supreme Court.54 From the time the Cigarette
Act was passed, plaintiffs have argued that their state law claims should not be
preempted, pointing to the legislative history of the Cigarette Act which made
reference to the continuing viability of state common law remedies.55 Adding
further ammunition, plaintiffs reasoned that Congress would have expressly pro-
hibited all state common law claims if that was their intent.
5 6
In responding to plaintiffs' arguments, cigarette manufacturers also pointed to
comments in the legislative history supporting their contention that all state law
claims should be preempted if they comply with the strictures of the Cigarette Act.
Representative Moss, for example, criticized the Preemption Section of the
Cigarette Act as an "absolute preemption... written into [the] legislation [which]
weakens rather than strengthens governmental safeguards aimed at protecting the
public health., 58 It follows, contend cigarette manufacturers, that Representative
Moss' concern would have been unfounded had the Cigarette Act not afforded them
an "absolute preemption. 59
Prior to the Cipollone6° decision, courts had the power to determine whether
state law was impliedly preempted by federal statutes which also contained express
preemption language.6' In other words, even if the express language of a federal
statute discussed preemption only in terms of a narrow issue, a court could hold that
Congress intended to occupy the entire field addressed by the statute, thus impliedly
preempting all state law claims. 62 The Supreme Court limited the lower courts' use
53. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
54. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 508 (presenting the issue as whether the Cigarette Act preempted petitioner's
common-law claims against the cigarette manufacturers).
55. Hernandez, Jr. & Parker, supra note 40, at 5; see id. at n.41 (citing Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act: Hearings on H.R. 643 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong.
Ist Sess. 554,579 (1969), which quotes Representative Watson who states that "[n]owhere in the Act of 1965 does
it preclude an individual or prevent an individual from pursuing a common-law liability action against a tobacco
company").
56. See Hernandez, Jr. & Parker, supra note 40, at 5 (noting that Congress did not expressly prohibit state
tort actions and would have had it so intended).
57. Id. at 6; see Marc Z. Edell & Harriet Dinegar Milks, The Cipollon Decision: Providing Guidelines for
Federal Preemption of Product Liability Claims, NJ. LAW., at 37, 38 (1993) (discussing the cigarette
manufacturers' argument in Cipollone that they should be immunized from liability under any state or common law
claim based on their compliance with the Act's labeling requirement).
58. Hernandez, Jr. & Parker, supra note 40, at 6, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEWs 2350,
2367.
59. See id. (analyzing the minority statement of Representative Moss).
60. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
61. See Edell & Milks, supra note 57, at 38 (recognizing that courts had the power to determine the scope
of implied preemption by looking at the statutory language or legislative history).
62. See, e.g., Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1026 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act impliedly preempted tort claims alleging inadequate labeling even
though the Eleventh Circuit Court did not determine whether those claims were addressed by the statute's
preemption section), vacated, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992).
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of implied preemption in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. by recognizing a long
standing "presumption against preemption."" In doing so, the Court took a close
look at the Cigarette Act's preemption language and found no express preemption
of all state tort claims, only those based on inadequate warnings in advertising and
promotion." The result was that the Cipollones' claims based on express warranty,
intentional fraud and misrepresentation, and conspiracy were not preempted by the
Cigarette Act.61
What the Cipollone Court had effectively done was establish a framework for
a new type of preemption analysis. 66 First, a court will look at preemption language
within the statute itself.67 If Congress crafted express preemption language, that
section will be the scope of preemption.6 8 Courts will only look at implied pre-
emption principles if the scope of preemption was not expressly defined by the
statute in any way. 9 Justice Stevens emphasized that when the scope of preemption
is defined by statute, there is no justification for a court to consider implied pre-
emption.70 Therefore, since the Cigarette Act did have preemption language which
only preempted claims based on inadequate warnings in advertising and promotion,
it was improper for the lower court to even inquire into the issue of implied pre-
emption.7
D. California Tort Liability Reform Package of 1987
Despite the Cipollone decision and its potentially devastating impact on the
tobacco industry, cigarette manufacturers continued to argue for immunity, focusing
on the states rather than the federal legal arena.72 California, like most states, had
incorporated language from the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A into
63. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518.
64. Id. at 531; see Edell & Milks, supra note 57, at 38 (discussing how the Court scrutinized the preemption
language of the statute and found no express preemption of state tort actions except for those involving advertising
and promotion).
65. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530.
66. Edell & Milks, supra note 57, at 37.
67. See id. at 40 (interpreting Cipollone as saying that when a statute includes a preemption section, the
scope of that preemption will be defined by the statutory language and not by implied preemption analysis).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517.
71. Id.
72. See Schemmel, supra note 1, at 689 (concluding that Cipollone laid the groundwork for the next wave
of plaintiffs but recognizing that manufacturers still have tremendous financial resources to fight lawsuits); see also
Kathryn Ericson, Tobacco Industry Tries to Avert More Lawsuits by States, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Nov. 30, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 907214 (stating that five cigarette manufacturers filed suit against the attorneys general of
Texas and Massachusetts to try to prevent more states from seeking reimbursement of health care costs from the
tobacco industry).
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its product liability statutes.73 In general, the codification of section 402A into
California Civil Code section 1714.45 helped society retain products which are
inherently unsafe yet desired nonetheless.74 However, included in this codification
is reference to comment i, relating to liability of commonly consumed products.75
There is fierce debate as to whether section 1714.45's reference to comment i was
intended to bestow cigarette manufacturers with an unqualified immunity or merely
immunity under certain circumstances.
76
Section 1714.45 was the result of a hasty compromise between two parties, one
wanting comprehensive changes in California tort law, the other wanting to main-
tain the status quo.' Struck in 1987, the reform package eventually passed by the
legislature was termed the "napkin deal" since it was hammered out by political
adversaries on the white cloth napkin of a Capitol city restaurant. 8 At least one
California Court of Appeal believed that "[i]t was commonly understood that the
measure embodying section 1714.45, which enjoyed the active or at least tacit
support of all these groups, would provide nearly complete immunity for manu-
facturers of the five enumerated products," tobacco being one of them.79 The
California Supreme Court would not go as far as the Court of Appeal did in calling
the tobacco companies' immunity "nearly complete,""0 but it did recognize that the
napkin deal was designed to prevent the enumerated products from being pulled off
the market by "eliminating their suppliers' direct monetary exposure for harm
caused by the products' normal consumption.""t
State Attorney General Dan Lungren pointed to section 1714.45 and the two
cases interpreting that statute when he concluded that he had no authority to join
other states that were suing the tobacco companies for medical expense
reimbursement.82 In response, Assembly Democrats criticized Lungren (a
73. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.45 (West Supp. 1997) (incorporating restatement language); see also supra
notes 30-39 (discussing the importance of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A as it relates to products
liability).
74. CAL CIv. CODE§ 1714.45 (West Supp. 1997).
75. Id. § 1714.45(a)(2).
76. See ASSEMBLY FLOOR, ANALYSIS OF AB 1603, at 2 (Apr. 24, 1997) (explaining the conflict between
Attorney General Dan Lungren's interpretation ofCalifornia Civil Code § 1714.45 and the interpretation ofChaptcr
25's authors).
77. See Richards v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th 985, 998-99, 928 P.2d 1181, 1189, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d
103, 111 (1997) (noting that the legislative history of California Civil Code § 1714.45 reveals it to be a "hasty
compromise of long-divergent interests"); see also American Tobacco Co. v. Superior Court, 203 Cal. App. 3d 480,
486, 255 Cal. Rptr. 280, 283 (1988) (indicating that the two sides had reached "stalemate" before coming up with
the compromise).
78. Dan Walters, Let a Million Tort Actions Blossom, CAL. LAW., Feb. 1994, at 39; AsSEmBLY FLOOR,
CO1T4rrEE ANALYSIS OFAB 1603, at I (June 3, 1997).
79. American Tobacco Co., 208 Cal. App. 3d at 487,255 Cal. Rptr. at 283.
80. Id.
81. Richards, 14 Cal. 4th at 998-99, 928 P.2d at 1189,60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111.
82. See ASSEMBLY FLOOR, CoMMirEr ANALYSIS oFAB 1603, at 2 (Apr. 24, 1997) (detailing Lungren's
interpretation of California Civil Code § 1714.45 which he believed prevented him from suing).
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Republican Gubernatorial hopeful), claiming that they had never intended to bestow
a nearly complete immunity on the tobacco companies.
I1. TOBACCO COMPANY LIABILITY TO PUBLIC ENTTmIs
Many tobacco companies complain that smoking is an individual right, a choice
that affects only the smoker and therefore should not be interfered with by govern-
ment.84 The truth is that smoking is riddled with external costs.8 5 In 1993, the
Centers for Disease Control estimated that smoking-related illness cost American
taxpayers nearly $22 billion in public funds used to pay for medical treatment.
86
Moreover, since alcohol and tobacco-related diseases affect low-income popu-
lations at a disproportionate rate, public hospitals are forced to foot the bill for those
without medical insurance. 7 As one Washington D.C. lawyer notes, "[i]n fulfilling
its duty to treat all indigents on a nondiscriminatory basis, the State has assumed a
crushing financial burden-a burden which in all equity and fairness should be
borne by those whose lucrative enterprise is responsible for the harm."88
A. Florida's Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act
In 1994, Florida became the first state to pass legislation giving itself the power
to sue cigarette companies for reimbursement of Medicaid costs paid by the State
in the treatment of tobacco-related illness.8 9 The law seeks to assure that Medicaid
will be the "payer of last resort for medically necessary goods and services fur-
nished to Medicaid recipients."' 9 To achieve this goal, the Medicaid Third-Party
83. See id. (stating that the authors of the bill disagreed with Lungren's interpretation of section 1714.45
in that it only provided immunity from lawsuits against those who had voluntarily consumed the product, not from
lawsuits by states seeking medical expense reimbursement); see Greg Lucas, California Sues Tobacco Industry,
$1.3 Billion Sought to Cover Medi-Cal Costs to Smokers, S.F CHRoN., June 13, 1997, at Al (reporting that
Lungren, as a GOP gubernatorial hopeful, had been under increasing criticism from Democratic Legislators to file
a lawsuit).
84. See Leichtman, supra note 10, at 745 (detailing the dangers of second-hand smoke to non-smokers and
repeating the position of the Tobacco Institute which claims cigarette smoke is not harmful to anyone).
85. See Raymond E. Gangarosa et al., Suits By Public Hospitals to Recover Expendituresfor the Treatment
of Disease, Injury and Disability Caused by Tobacco and Alcohol, 22 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 81, 90 (1994) (listing
some of the external costs as "imping[ing] on the operation of public hospitals . . . eroding tax bases, distorting
the health care needs of communities and inducing demand for competing infrastructures: police, courts, jails,
prisons and welfare"); see Leichtman, supra note 10, at 744 (adding lost productivity and early morbidity as
external costs).
86. See Frohlich, supra note 11, at 447 (reporting statistics showing that smoking-related illnesses cost
Americans $50 billion in 1993,43.3% of which was paid by public funds).
87. Gangarosa et al., supra note 85, at 87; see id. at 90 (describing public hospitals as "payers of last resort"
when it comes to medical treatment).
88. Jonathan S. Massey, The Florida Tobacco Liability Law: Fairy Tale Objections to a Reasonable
Solution to Florida's Medicaid Crisis, 46 FLA. L. REv. 591, 594-95 (1994).
89. See Frohlich, supra note , at 445 (noting that Massachusetts passed similar legislation the same year).
90. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(1) (West Supp. 1997).
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Liability Act provides the state with a cause of action against a liable third party to
recover the costs of providing Medicaid.9' In addition, the Act goes further by: (1)
Providing that the state's cause of action is independent of any rights or causes of
action that the Medicaid recipient may have;92 (2) granting the state an automatic
subrogation of a recipient's right to sue upon receiving Medicaid assistance and an
automatic assignment of the recipient's claims to the state;93 (3) enabling the state
to bring a class action without going through the procedural requirement of
identifying each member of the class; 94 (4) liberalizing causation and damages rules
by allowing them to be proven by statistical analysis; 5 and (5) allowing principles
of common law and equity as to assignment, lien, subrogation, comparative negli-
gence, assumption of the risk, and all other affirmative defenses normally available
to a liable third party to be abrogated to the extent necessary to ensure full recovery
by Medicaid from third-party resources.96
As a result of its broad changes to common law liability principles, the Act
drew critics and supporters alike, making it one of the most controversial pieces of
Florida legislation that year.97 Critics of the Act claim that the changes made to
common law liability principles "unfairly tilt the judicial system against third-party
defendants responsible for state Medicaid expenditures." 98 They further claim that
a much more efficient way to hold responsible third parties liable would be to
institute a tax. 99 Proponents, on the other hand, downplay the changes to common
law liability principles by arguing that the Act simply makes the judicial process
more efficient.10 Even though the position of critics and proponents of the Act
remains adversarial, both sides agree that the Act is very confusing and appears to
have been a hasty piece of legislation passed without much consideration.' 0 '
91. Id. § 409.910(6) (West Supp. 1997).
92. Id. § 409.910(6)(a) (West Supp. 1997).
93. Id § 409.910(6)(b),(c) (West Supp. 1997).
94. Id. § 409.910(9) (West Supp. 1997).
95. Id.
96. Id. § 409.910(0) (West Supp. 1997).
97. See Frohlich, supra note 11, at 452 (concluding that the controversy surrounding the Act was illustrated
by the Florida Legislature's vote to repeal it merely 12 months after it was passed, and by the Governor',
subsequent veto of the repeal).
98. Massey, supra note 88, at 591.
99. See Richard N. Pearson, The Florida Medicaid Third-Pary Liability Act, 46 FLA. L, REV. 609, 631
(1994) (hypothesizing that if Florida had passed a tax increase in 1994 instead of the Act, it would have been
collecting revenue all this time to offset the costs of treating those with tobacco-related illnesses and would not have
to share the revenue with lawyers who must litigate under the Act).
100. See Massey, supra note 88, at 592 (describing the Florida Act as "streamlining" the process by which
the state can hold responsible third parties liable and further contending that the Act does not change standards of
conduct to which third parties are liable, nor does it alter the State's burden of proof).
101. See Pearson, supra note 99, at 611 (recognizing that the Act is very confusing, appears to be "last-
minute, inadequately considered legislation," and the causes of actions authorized by the statute are not clear).
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 29
B. Tobacco Liability to Public Entities Before Chapter 25
Before the enactment of Chapter 25, there was no California law directly
addressing the issue of tobacco liability to public entities. Tobacco liability, in
general, was controlled by California Civil Code section 1714.45 and a number of
cases which construed that statute.'02 California Civil Code section1714.45, which
was part of the comprehensive tort reform package of 1987,03 stated that a manu-
facturer or seller of a product was not liable in a products liability action if the
product is inherently unsafe and ordinary consumers know that it is inherently
unsafe." 4 In the express language of the statute, tobacco was listed as one of the
products immune from products liability claims.0 5 When prompted to file suit
against the cigarette manufacturers for medical expense reimbursement, State
Attorney General Dan Lungren concluded that the language of section 1714.45 pre-
vented him from doing so.YO' In addition, he relied on the rulings of two state court
cases which had interpreted section 1714.45.07
American Tobacco Co. v. Superior Court, a 1989 ruling out of the first District
Court of Appeal, 08 held section 1714.45's immunity for tobacco companies to be
"automatic" and "nearly complete.""° Seven years later, the California Supreme
Court interpreted section 1714.45 in Richards v. Owens Corning, Inc. 110 The State's
highest court did not rule on the correctness of the American Tobacco decision,"
11
but it did emphasize that section 1714.45 negated tobacco companies' liability to
"knowing and voluntary smokers," meaning that the tobacco companies were not
liable for the smoking-related illnesses of smokers who knew the dangers of
102. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1714.45 (West Supp. 1997); see SENATEFLOOR, COMMTrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1603,
at 2 (May 22, 1997) (citing California Civil Code § 1714.45 as "existing law" and stating that this statute has been
construed by case law); see, eg., Richards v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th 985, 928 P.2d 1181, 60 Cal. Rptr.
2d 103 (1997) (construing California Civil Code § 1714.45); American Tobacco Co. v. Superior Court, 208 Cal.
App. 3d 480, 255 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1989) (interpreting California Civil Code § 1714.45).
103. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, CoMMI'TE ANALYSIS OF AB 1603, at 1 (June 3, 1997); see supra notes 72-83 and
accompanying text (providing background on the California Tort Liability Reform Package of 1987).
104. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.45(a)(1),(2) (west Supp. 1997).
105. Id. § 1714.45(a)(2) (West Supp. 1997).
106. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (detailing Lungren's refusal to file suit against the tobacco
companies for medical expense reimbursement). But see Tom Dresslar, AG Plans to Sue Tobacco Industry, S.F.
DAILY J., June 11, 1997, at 7 (observing that state and federal court actions by 16 local California governments for
medical expense reimbursement have been allowed to go forward by using theories of fraud and unlawful business
practice rather than products liability).
107. See ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OFAB 1603, at 2 (Apr. 24, 1997) (indicating that Lungren
felt that California Civil Code § 1714.45 prevented him from filing suit); id. at 1-2 (stating that California Civil
Code § 1714.45 has been interpreted by the American Tobacco and Richards' decisions to bestow an immunity onto
tobacco companies).
108. American Tobacco Co. v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 3d 480,255 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1989).
109. Id. at 487, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 283; see Dresslar, supra note 106, at 7 (citing the American Tobacco
decision).
110. Richards v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th 985,928 P.2d 1181, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 103 (1997).
111. Id. at 1003,928 P.2d at 1192. 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 114, n.8.
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smoking and voluntarily accepted the risk.1 2 Without a conclusive state ruling on
whether section 1714.45 barred a public entity from suing the tobacco companies,
Lungren felt his hands were tied.'
13
C. Chapter 25
Chapter 25 does not seek to change existing law but rather to clarify it so that
no question exists as to the viability of a state lawsuit to recover medical expenses
from the tobacco industry 114 According to the Legislature, Civil Code section
1714.45 "does not apply to, and never applied to, an action brought by a public
entity to recover the value of benefits provided to individuals injured by a tobacco-
related illness." ' Unlike the Florida Act which changes common law rules of
liability,11 6 Chapter 25 asserts that it does not "alter or amend existing California
law.""' 7 In addition to its assertion that it does not change California law, Chapter
25 specifically permits public entities to file lawsuits to recover health care costs
caused by the tobacco industry's tortious behavior.1 3 Furthermore, even if the
injured individual's claim is barred by section 1714.45, Chapter 25 disallows this
fact as being used as a defense against public entities.1 9
Chapter 25's major opponent, the Tobacco Institute, argues that the amend-
ments to section 1714.45 were unnecessary in light of City and Count), of San
Francisco v. Phillip Morris.20 This federal district court case involved a public
entity suing the tobacco industry for medical expense reimbursement."12 Despite the
fact that section 1714.45 was in full effect and the American Tobacco decision had
already found tobacco companies to have a "nearly complete immunity,'122 this
federal court found that state law fraud and special duty claims are not barred by
section 1714.45." If public entities can already sue under section 1714.45,
questions the Tobacco Institute, why then is Chapter 25 necessary unless the
112. Id. at 1000, 928 P.2d at 1190, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 112.
113. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (detailing Lungren's refusal to file suit against the tobacco
companies for medical expense reimbursement).
114. CAL. C[V. CODE § 1714.45(d) (amznded by Chapter 25).
115. Id.
116. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text (analyzing Florida's MedicaidMird-Pary Liability Act).
117. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.45(c) (amended by Chapter 25).
11 E. Id. § 1714.45(d) (added by Chapter 25); see Dresslar, supra note 106, at 1 (estimating the state's
tobacco-related Medi-Cal costs at $350 million per year).
119. CAL CIV. CODE § 1714.45(d) (added by Chapter 25).
120. City and County of San Francisco v. Philip Morris, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1130, 1130 (N.D. Cal. 1997);
SENATE FLOO, CONstrIrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1603, at 3 (May 22, 1997); see id. (indicating that the Tobacco
Institute contends that Chapter 25 apparently "singles out.., an unpopular industry and imposes special rules of
liability").
121. City and County of San Francisco, 957 F. Supp. at 1134.
122. American Tobacco Co. v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 3d 480, 487, 255 Cal. Rptr. 280, 283 (1989).
123. City and County of San Francisco, 957 F. Supp. at 1140.
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Legislature is actually seeking to change existing law? 24 While there is a trace of
logic in this argument, it eventually fails because Chapter 25 itself states that it is
declarative of existing law.1" More than likely, the Tobacco Institute's real motive
for this position is so that it can continue to argue for unqualified immunity.
D. Chapter 25's Effect on California Welfare and Institutions Code Section
14124.71
California Welfare and Institutions Code section 14124.71 provides that the
state or county may file an action against a third party for reimbursement of medical
expenses when the third party is responsible for the injury to the person receiving
medical assistance from the government agency. 126 However, after the Richards
decision, it is unclear whether a section 14124.71 action could be brought if section
1714.45 negates liability.127
As previously discussed, the California Supreme Court in Richards construed
section 1714.45 "to negate liability to voluntary users of tobacco for the mere
manufacture or sale of these products." '128 Although Welfare and Institutions Code
section 14124.71 creates a state cause of action, if the individual is injured by
voluntarily using tobacco, the tobacco company might successfully argue that the
immunity they have against suits by the voluntary smoker should be imputed onto
the state. 29 Understandably, the Richards decision left unclear whether an
affirmative defense used pursuant to section 1714.45 would negate liability in an
action brought under section 14124.71.3
In order to clear this ambiguity, the California Legislature made specific
reference to section 14124.71 in Chapter 25.131 According to Chapter 25, if a public
entity brings an action under section 14124.71, the affirmative defense afforded by
section 1714.45 to individuals who voluntarily smoke cannot be used as an
affirmative defense against the public entities.1
31
124. SENATE FLOOR, COMMrTEEANALYSIS OF AB 1603, at 3 (May 22, 1997).
125. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714A5(c) (West Supp. 1997).
126. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 14124.71(a) (West 1991).
127. Richards v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th 985, 1000, 928 P.2d 1181, 1190-91, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 103,
112-13 (1997).
128. Id.
129. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITI'EE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1603, at 5-6 (Apr. 24, 1997).
130. Id.
131. CAL CIV. CODE § 1714.45(d) (amended by Chapter 25).
132. Id.
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E. Retroactivity and Legislative Intent
An early challenge to Florida's Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act 133 dealt with
the issue of retroactivity."M The tobacco industry argued that its due process rights
had been violated because the statute went into effect retroactively without giving
them proper notice. 35 California sought to circumvent similar challenges by stating
within Chapter 25 that it is merely a clarification of existing law rather than an
amendment to it.136 Since deference is given to legislative intent, an enactment
which merely clarifies or declares the original legislative intent does not raise issues
of retroactivity.
137
The only way to completely avoid the retroactivity issue would be for Attorney
General Dan Lungren to sue only for future damages.3 However, since Chapter 25
states that it is merely declaratory of a law that was passed in 1987, he would
probably be heavily criticized for not trying to recover past damages as well.' 39 At
least one California Court of Appeal has held that "an amendment to a statute for
the purpose of clarifying preexisting law or making express the original legislative
intent is not considered a change in the law; ... it simply states the law as it was all
the time, and no question of retroactive application is involved."'t40 Since
"clarifying" is purportedly what Chapter 25 aims to accomplish, it should survive
challenges to retroactivity.'
4'
IV. TOBACCO COMPANY LIABILITY TO PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS
The tobacco industry has enjoyed an unprecedented history of success as defen-
dants in injury suits brought by consumers of their products. 4 2 In an industry
manufacturing consumer products that have proven to be extremely dangerous when
133. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910 (West Supp. 1997).
134. See Frohlich, supra note 11, at 455 (noting the tobacco industry's challenge to the Florida Act based
on the theory that "a retroactive application of the Florida Act would violate the due process guarantees of the
United States Constitution by creating new duties without fair notice and an opportunity for the manufacturers to
change their conduct").
135. Id.
136. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714.45(c) (West Supp. 1997).
137. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMnTEE, COm DrFEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1603, at 4-S (Apr. 24, 1997)
(discussing the retroactivity issues that arise when the Legislature states that its provisions are merely declaratory
of existing law).
139. Dresslar, supra note 106, at 7.
139. ld.
140. City of Redlands v. Sorenson, 176 Cal. App. 3d 202, 211,221 Cal. Rptr. 728, 732 (1985).
141. SENATE JUDICIARY COMITIrEE, COMMrmfEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1603, at 4-5 (Apr. 24, 1997).
142. See Schemmel, supra note 1, at 666 (describing the tobacco companies' record against plaintiffs as
"perfect").
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consumed, 43 this history of success is more than a little unusual.144 Prior to the
Cipollone'45 decision in 1992, there had been no significant victory for a plaintiff
in a personal injury action against a tobacco company.'" Today, their history of
success in the courtroom seems almost certain to change. 47
A. A New Wave of Class Action Lawsuits
Because of the tobacco industry's vast monetary resources and its willingness
to litigate every lawsuit and not settle, injured individuals have begun to band
together and file class action lawsuits. 48 Since class action makes the financial
burden of bringing a lawsuit easier to deal with for individuals, plaintiffs are not so
worried about litigating against the seemingly endless financial power of tobacco
companies."' The most noteworthy class action was certified in the Eastern District
of Louisiana on February 17, 1995.l50
The prime assertion by plaintiffs' attorneys in the Louisiana class action suit is
that nicotine is an addictive drug and tobacco companies have long hidden that fact
from the public.15' Riding on the wave of this new "class action trend," on June 11,
1997, a San Diego law firm filed California's first class action against tobacco com-
panies. 52 The suit, captioned Brown v. The American Tobacco Co., Inc., is suing for
funds to help smokers quit and to monitor smokers for tobacco-related illness which
may develop in the future. 53 'With the passage of Chapter 570, however, smokers
may no longer need to use class action suits to file claims against tobacco com-
panies."
143. See Frohlich, supra note 11, at 446 (listing a number of illnesses caused by smoking cigarettes).
144. See Schemmel, supra note 1, at 664 (indicating that courts base liability for harmful products, like
cigarettes, on strict liability concepts); see also Riley, supra note 30, at 1110 (discussing the emergence of product
liability to hold manufacturers of dangerous products responsible for the harms caused by their products).
145. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
146. Schemmel, supra note 1, at 666.
147. See infra notes 160-68 and accompanying text (analyzing Chapter 570's impact on the current state of
tobacco litigation in California).
148. See, e.g., Geyelin, supra note 19, at BI (reporting the recent certification ofa class action lawsuit against
tobacco companies in New Orleans); Class Action Seeks Funds to Help and Monitor Smokers, S.F. DAILY J., June
11, 1997, at 7 (discussing the recent filing of a class action lawsuit against the tobacco companies in California).
149. See Curriden, supra note 28, at 20 (noting the tobacco industry's willingness to fight all lawsuits no
matter what the cost so that individual plaintiffs would never win their lawsuits).
150. See Geyelin, supra note 19, at B1 (calling the New Orleans class action suit "a landmark case"); Bill
Voelker, Tobacco Class Action OK'd, NEW ORLEANS TRAEs-PICAYUNE, Feb. 18, 1995, at Al (noting the date of
the judge's certification).
151. Voelker, supra note 150, at Al.
152. Class Action Seeks Funds to Help and Monitor Smokers, supra note 148, at 7.
153. Id.
154. See infra notes 159-67 and accompanying text (describing the impact Chapter 570 will have on
individual tort claims against the tobacco industry).
1998 / Torts
B. Tobacco Liability to Private Individuals Before Chapter 570
As discussed above, California Civil Code section 1714.45 affords tobacco
companies immunity from suits by "voluntary and knowing smokers."' 55 This
provision came about as a result of the Comprehensive Tort Reform Package of
1987.156 Before that, the tobacco industry had no real immunity from suits by
injured consumers, only to the extent that they could argue plaintiff's assumed a
known risk.' 57 When a California Court of Appeals interpreted section 1714.45, it
found this code provision to be "poorly drafted" and held that it granted tobacco
companies an unconditional immunity.58
C. Chapter 570
Chapter 570 amends section 1714.45 by deleting "tobacco" from the illustrative
list of common consumer products which are immune from products liability for
normal use.t59 In addition, Chapter 570 specifies that the immunity which is
afforded to providers of sugar, castor oil, alcohol, and butter will no longer be
extended to the tobacco industry.'6° In other words, cigarette manufacturers will no
longer be immune from product liability actions. The intent of Chapter 570's
authors is to restore products liability actions (as they pertain to the tobacco
industry) to the way they were prior to the Comprehensive Tort Reform Package of
1987.161
Chapter 570's authors and other supporters believe the return of products
liability principles to pre- "napkin deal" days to be necessary in light of "new
evidence.., showing tobacco companies may have deliberately manipulated the
level of nicotine.., in tobacco products so as to create and sustain addiction in
smokers."'62 Supporters also point to the tobacco industry's alleged concealment of
information which confirms the harmful effects of tobacco use.' 63 One Chapter 570
155. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.45 (West Supp. 1997); see Richards v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th 985,
1000, 928 P.2d 1181, 1190, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 103, 112 (1997) (interpreting the scope of California Civil Code §
1714.45 on the limited facts of the case).
156. See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text (discussing the Comprehensive Tort Reform Package of
1987).
157. SENATEFLOOR, CoNsfTrEE ANALYSIS OFSB 1603, at 3-4 (June 19, 1997).
158. American Tobacco Co. v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 3d 480, 485, 255 Cal. Rptr. 280,282 (1989);
it at 487, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 283.
159. Compare CAL. Civ. CODE § 1714.45(a)(2) (Vest Supp. 1997) (listing tobacco as one of the commonly
consumed consumer products that is considered "inherently dangerous"), with CAL. Civ. CODE § 1714.45(a)(2)
(amended by Chapter 570) (removing "tobacco" from the illustrative list of inherently dangerous consumer
products).
160. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.45(b) (amended by Chapter 570).
161. SENATEFLOOR, COMMTEE ANALYsIS OFSB 1603, at 3-4 (June 19, 1997).
162. Id. at4.
163. Id.; see supra note 18 and accompanying text (chronicling the fact that the tobacco industry knew that
cigarettes were harmful to health yet actively concealed that fact from the public).
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supporter and key participant in the Tort Liability Reform Package of 1987, the
California Medical Association, claims that this amendment is necessary because
legislators of the original provision never intended for California courts to interpret
such a broad immunity into section 1714.45.'64
Critics of Chapter 570 include not only the Tobacco Institute, but the California
Chamber of Commerce which forwards a very convincing argument.165 In a short
public statement, the Chamber wrote: "We do not believe that individuals should
be able to engage in inherently dangerous activities and then sue someone for the
harm which results from that activity. The current law requires that individuals
accept responsibility for the known consequences of their actions which we believe
to be sound policy."'1
The Chamber of Commerce's argument is much more persuasive and common-
sensical than the authors' response, which states that elimination of the immunity
is justified since they are leaving affirmative defenses, such as assumption of the
risk, intact. 67 Therefore, argue the authors, let juries decide what percentage
tobacco companies should be held responsible rather than grant them a "no-
questions-asked" immunity. While in theory the authors' argument is a good one,
the authors fail to recognize the practical effect of the statute. When jurors are
deciding between a ninety year-old "victim" of lung cancer who had been smoking
since she was fourteen years-old and a tobacco industry representative, the tobacco
industry appears much less sympathetic. Since jurors are allowed a great deal of
subjectivity when apportioning fault in an assumption of the risk situation, there is
the real danger that emotion will rule over reason; an unsound policy to forward.
VI. CONCLUSION
While Chapter 25 is needed at this time to clean up some of the confusion
surrounding tobacco company immunity to public entities, Chapter 570 appears
overzealous in allowing all injury cases to be litigated. At some point, smokers need
to take responsibility for their own actions. It is dangerous to encourage a public
policy which would allow an individual to choose to participate in an activity which
he knows is harmful, and then come back, when injured, and sue the manufacturer
of the product which enabled him to participate in the dangerous activity. Even
though Chapter 570 preserves the assumption of the risk defense, the last thing
cigarette manufacturers are going to want to do is stand up in front of a jury and
compete for the court's sympathy with a lone injured smoker. Even if the tobacco
company lawyers proved without question that the smoker completely assumed the
risk, a jury may still come in with verdicts against the tobacco company. In
164. SENATE FLOOR, COimrrrEEANALYSIS OpSB 1603, at4 (June 19, 1997).
165. Id. at 3.
166. Id. at 4.
167. ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMiMTrEr ANALYSIS OF SB 67, at 2.
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addition, the potential for court backlog and frivolous lawsuits indicates that
Chapter 570 is probably ill-conceived.
On the eve of California's tobacco liability package, multi-state negotiators
reached a historic settlement with tobacco companies for an estimated $300 billion.
Even though tobacco companies wanted complete legal protection from private
suits as a condition of the multi-billion dollar settlement, state attorneys general
held their ground and did not agree to usurp private individuals' causes of action.
Only time will tell how long the tobacco industry can survive this latest legal
assault.
